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[L. A. No. 24968. In Bank.

Apr. 24, 1959.]

THE TEXAS COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v.
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents.
[L. A. No. 25102. In Bank.

Apr. 24, 1959.]

FORSTER SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.
[1] Taxation - Assessment - Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The

taxable interest in a leasehold is the right to possession and
use of the land for the unexpired term of the lease; its value
is not lessened by the amount the lessee agreed to pay for it,
but is determined by the present value of the use for the period
of the lease and the value of the lessor's interest is determined
by the present value of the use thereafter. The lessor's right to
receive rent is not an interest in the land that must be deducted
to determine the value of the lessee's interest, but only the
price the lessee must pay for it.
[1] Method or rule for valuation of leasehold interest for purpose
of. property taxation, note, 84 A.L.R. 1310. See also Oal.J'ur.2d Taxation, § 187; Am.J'ur., Taxation, § 711 et seq.
lIrIcK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 13, 15] Taxation, § 191; [3, 4]
Taxation, § 186; [5,6] Taxation, § 189; [7] Eminent Domain, § 50;
[9] Taxation, § 58; [10, 12] Taxation, §§ 72, 73; [11] Taxation,
172; [14] Taxation, § 24.
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[2] Id. - Assessment - Va.luation--Leasehold Estatcs.-In deter·
mining taxable interest in a leasehold, the leasehold is not less
valuable because it has not be('n paid for in advance, and to
draw a distinction between rent paid and rent to be paid
confuses the equity the lessee has in the leasehold with its
value. That equity, which may arise either from the lessee's
prepayment of rent or from an excess of the value of the use
. over the future rent agreed to be paid for it, is of no moment
to a prospective purchaser interested only in the value of the
use and possession for the unexpired term of the lease; such
purchaser will pay for that interest what it is worth and, since
it belongs to the lessee, it is taxable to him at that value
whether or not he has assumed rental or other obligations that
will prevent his realizing any return to himself.
[3] ld. - Assessment - Valua.tion - Mode of Valuation.-The net
earnings to be capitalized, under the capitalization of income
method of valuing property, are not those of the present owner
of the property, but those l'eflected by the price a pro!'pective
purchaser might be expected to pllY.
[4] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valua.tion.-Taxation
of property at its value without regard to the owner's equity
therein is an established principle of ad valorem taxation.
[6] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-Real Property-Possessory Estates.-A conditional vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at the
full value of property as its owner though he could realize little
or nothing by its sale.
[8] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-B.eal Property-Possessory Estates.-The continued enjoyment of the benefits of ownership
of a fee or possessory interest is dependent on discharging the
obligations to secure such benefits, and for tax pW'poses there
is no logical basis for treating those obligations differently as
they happen to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor or a
mortgagee.
[7] Eminent Doma.in-Compensa.tion-Lea.seholda.-In eminent domain the full value of the lessee's possessory jnt.erest must be
paid for, but since the taking discharges the obligation to pay
future rent, the value of that obligation to the lessor must be
awarded to him. Although the lessee is awarded damages
equal only to the value of his equity, he receives the full value
of his possessory intere.~t, since his obligation to pay rent is
discharged.
[8] Ta.xa.tion-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In determining the taxable interest of a leasehold, the value of a
long-term possessory interest in the leasehold may approach
the value of the fee and, even in the case of land that doe:i
[7] See O~.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 36; Am.Jur., Eminent
Domain, §§ 232,296.
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not depreciate in vRlue, the present valuc of a reversion that
cannot be enjoyed for many ~'eRrs may he small compared to
the present vlllue of the use in the intE'l;m. Thus, the value
of the right to use the land in perpetuity may be little ~rellter
than the value of the right to nse it for the durlltion of a long.
term lellse, and in such case a purchRser of the fee of unleased
land would PIlY or agree to pay little more than a lessee for a
long-term lease.
[9] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Leaseholds.-A city leasing its land
does not merely use it, but creates valuable privately-held
possessory interests, and the owners of such interests must pay
taxes on them just as lessees of private property do through
increased rents. Their use is not public, but private, and as such
should carry its share of the tax burden.
[10] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city does not lose
its tax exemption by leasing its land; the reversion is not
taxed, since it is only the value of the use for the unexpired
term of that lease that is assessed. Whereas lessees of private
property indirectly pay taxes through rent on the full value of
the land including the lessor's reversion, the city's lessees pay
taxes only on the value of the possessory interests granted to
them by the city.
[11] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city is not afforded
a competitive advantage over private owners when it sells the
fee in its land, since the land is taxable to its new private
owner whatever its source.
[12] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city is not entitled
to a competitive advantage over private lessors when it sells
lesser interests carved out of the public domain. It would be
able to charge higher rents if it could extend the mllntle of its
tax exemption over the private interests it creates in its lands,
but since it is only its own property that is tax exempt, it is not
entitled to that advantage. Since the tax is on the private
interest alone, it is immaterial that denial of that competitive
advantage might be an economic burden on the city.
[13] ld.-Assessmcnt-Valuation-Leasehold Estates. - The rule
that where a constitutional provision or statute has received
a given construction by a court of last resort and contracts
have been made or property rights acquired "under and in
accordance with its decision such contracts will not be invalidated nor will vested rights acquired under the decision be
impaired by a change of construction adopted in a subsequent
decision, is not applicable in a case involving the taxable interest in a leasehold, since recognition of the correct rule of
valuation of possessory interests for tax purposes neither invulidatt's the leases nol' impairs v~sted rights.
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 57; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 435.

[14] Id. - Statute - Amendment or Change-Vested Rigats.-AI. though t1l08e who Require property or make eOlltracts in reliance on existing tax laws may be disappointed in their cconomir.
expectations whl'n those laws are chanb-ed, they acquire no
. vestc.d right that such changes shall not be made. Taxes on
existing interests are not immutable, since within constitutional
limits the Legislature has full freedom to change them.
[15] Id. - Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates.-Rev. &
Tax. Code, § 107.1, relating to assessmell.t of possessory interests arising out of a lease of exempt property, cannot be given
retrospective effeet with regard to taxes that became due before
the code section became effective, since to do so would authorize
an unconstitutional gift of public funds. (Const., art. IV, § 31.)

APPEAL from jUdgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. H. Eugene Breitenbach and John F. Aiso,
Judges. Affirmed.
Actions to recover taxes on possessory interests in taxexempt lands owned by a city. Judgments for defendants after
their demurrers were sustained, affirmed.
J. A. Tucker, C. L. Mead, Jr., R. K. Barrows, Holbrook,
Tarr & O'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., and Francis H.
o 'Neill for Appellants.
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney (Oakland), and Robert
G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa Monica), as Amici Curiae
on behalf of AppeUants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles
DeFlon, Deputy County Counsel for Respondents.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine, Assistant
Attorney General, Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy Attorney General, Felix S. Wahrhaftig, Albert E. Weller, County Counsel
(San Bernardino), J. B. Lawrence, Deputy County Counsel,
James Don Keller, District Attorney and County Counsel (San
Diego), CarroU H. Smith, Deputy County CounS'el, Roy A.
Gustafson, District Attorney (Ventura), Joel E. Ogle, County
Counsel (Orange), Stephen K. Tamura, Assistant County
Counsel, and MandIe Rottman as Amici Curiae on behalf of
Respondents.
.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaiutiff'R brought these aetiolls to recover
taxes for the years 1956 and J 957 on possessory intereRts ill
tax-exempt lands owned by the city of I.Jos Angeles. Jl1dg-
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mellL.. for dcC('ntilluts WCl·.' (,1I1f'rl'd art.'r t1"'ir .1f'lIIl1l·\·t>rK wel'f'
sustained, and plaintiffs appeal.
The basic issue presented is whether the value of a possessory ;
interest in tax-exempt land under the capitalization of income
method of valuation is the present worth of the use of the land
for the unexpired term of the lease or that worth less the
present worth of rentals to become due.
Plaintitrs contend that the county board of equalization
erred in sustaining assessments based on the present worth
of the use of the land for the unexpired term of the lease.
They point out that the "full cash value" standard of assessment (Const., art. XI, § 12; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401), is
defined as "the amount at which property would be taken in
payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor" (Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 110), or "the price it would bring if offered on an open
market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller
could take advantage of the exigencies of the other" (DeLuz
Homes, be. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 563 [290
P.2d 544]), and that a prospective assignee of the lease would
pay only the difference between the value of the use he would
receh'e and the rental obligation he would assume. Accordingly, they conclude that it is that difference or bonus value,
if any, that is the taxable value of the leasehold.
Plaintiffs would also arrive at the same valuation for the
leasehold by deducting the value of the claimed interest of thc
lessor in the land from the value of the fee. Thus, the value
of the fee is taken as the present worth of the use of the land
in pefpetuity. The lessor retains the present value of the use
of the reversion plus the present value of the rents reserved.
If the present value of the rents reserved is equal to the
present value of the use for the unexpired term of the lease,
the lessor's interest would be equal to the fee value and' the
lessee's interest would be valueless. Plaintiffs conclude that
under either of these approaches a possessory interest has
value only if the value of the use of the land exceed!; the rent
payable under the lease.
, [1] Defendants contend that the taxable interest is the
right to possession and use of the land for the unexpired
term of the lease and that its value is not lessened by the
amount the lessee has agreed to pay for it. They contend
that there is no distinction for tax purposes between granting
the possession and use in perpetuity by a sale of the fee and
granting them for a limited period by a leasf', that in neithpt"
casc lllay till' .'ost of the interest granh'd he dl'duf'ted fro:1I
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its value. In the case of a lease, they would divide the total
value· of the fee as determined by its use according to the
value. of the uses for the respective periods involved. Thus
the value· of the lessee;s interest would be determined by the
present value of the use for the period of the lease and the
value of the lessor's interest by thc present value of the usc
thereafter. Together they would equal the present value of
the use in perpetuity, or fee value. They conclude that the
lessor's right to receiYe rent is not an interest in the land
that must be deducted to determine the value of the lessee's
interest but only the price the lessee must pay for it.
DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego, 45 Ca1.2d 546
[290 P.2d 544] ; Fairfield Gardens, Inc.v. Oounty of Solano,
45 Ca1.2d 575 [290 P.2d 562] ; Victor Valley Housing OOt·p.
v. Oounty of San Bernardino, 45 Cal.2d 580 [290 P.2d 565] ;
and El Toro Dev. 00. v. Oounty of Orange, 45 Ca1.2d 586
[290 P.2d 569], fully support defendants' contentious. Those
cases all involved the valuation of long-term possessory interests in federally owned property by the capitalization of income method. Relying on L. W. Blinn Lbr. 00. v. Oounty of
Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474 [14 P.2d 512J; and Hammond
Lbr. 00. v. Oounty of L08 Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 P.
896], the taxpayers contended that deductions from expected
gross income should be made both for rent and amortization
of the cost of improvements that became the property of the
lessor and would revert to it on the termination of the lease.
Although the assessors had allowed deductions for the nominal
ground rental of $100 per year applicable to each leasehold,
they had denied deductions for amortization. We concluded,
however, that no distinction could be made between rent
and the cost of improvements that revert to the lessor, for
both were part of the purchase price of the leasehold, and
held that no deduction could be made for that purchase price.
We disapproved statements to the contrary in the Blinn
case and pointed out that the assessor's allowance of a deduction for rent in the Hammond case did not control that
decision. (DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45
Ca1.2d 546, 567, 570 [290 P.2d 544].)
Plaintiffs contend, however, that in the DeLuz case and its
companion cases the court was concerned only with deductions for rent paid in the past, not rent to become due in the
rutur(>. 'fhere is no merit in this contention. We were concerned with deductions from expected gross income, deductions that would necessarily be made, if allowed, against in-
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comc to accrue in the future. Obviously only .future rcnt
could be relevant in this context. Thus, in Fairfield Gardens, Inc. v. County of Solano, 45 Ca1.2d 575, 578-579 [290,
P.2d 562], we stated: "The method used by the assessor inl
the present case is similar to that approved in DeLuz, but
we must disapprove it to the extcnt that it deducts rent
paid by Fairfield to the government from anticipated annual
gross income. The rent that a leasehold would command on an
open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor
seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other is
based on expected future net income from the leasehold without regard to the rent presently paid by the lessee, and there- I
fore such rent is not deducted in estimating the earning power
of the leasehold. The assessment of the possessory interest
of Fairfield for thc tax year 1953-1954, however, need not
be set aside becausc of the erroneous deduction of the $200
rent paid to the government [two leaseholds were involved],
for although the error was favorable to the taxpayer, the
county did not appeal [citations], and, moreover, de minimis
non curat le:c. [Citations.]" Since the deduction involved
had been made from" anticipated annual gross income," it is
clear that the $200 rent referred to ,vas not a single payment
made in the past but the obligation to pay $200 each year in
the future pursuant to the terms of the existing leases.
[2] A leasehold is not less valuable because it has not
been paid for in advance, and to draw a distinction between
rent paid and rent to be paid confuses the equity the lessee
has in the leasehold with its value. That equity may arise
either from the lessee's prepayment of rent or from an excess
of the value of the use over the future rent agreed to be paid
for it. It may not exist at all. In any event it is of no
moment to a prospective purchaser interested only in the
value of the use and possession of the property for the unexpired term of the lease. Such a purchaser will pay for that
interest what it is worth, and since it belongs to' the lessee,
it is taxable to him at that value whether or not he has assumed rental or other obligations that will prevent his realizing any return to himself. [3] .. The present owner may
have invested well or poorly, lllay have contracted to pay very
high rent or very low rent, and may have built expensive
improvements or none at all. To value the property by
capitalizing his anticipated net earnings would make the value
of property equal to the present value of his profits; since,
however, the legislative standard is «full cash value,' it is
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clear that whatever may be the rationale of the property tax,
it is not the profitableness of property to its present owner.
If a purchaser wonld buy a given property on an open market,
t he property has a value equal to the price such purchaser
might be expected to pay." (DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County
of San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 566 [290 P.2d 544].)
[4] Taxation of property at its value without regard to
the owner's equity therein is an established principle of ad
valorem taxation. [5] Thus, a conditional vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at the full value of property as its owner
even though he could realize little or nothing by its sale.
(S.B.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569-570 [66 S.Ct.
749, 90 L.Ed. 851]; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Cal.2d 637, 643
[192 P.2d 5] ; DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego,
45 Ca1.2d 546, 573 [290 P.2d 544].) [6] The continued
enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of the fee or a possessory interest is dependent on discharging the obligations
assumed to secure such benefits, and there is no logical basis
for treating those obligations differently as they happen to
run to a lessor, a conditional vendor, or a mortgagee.
[7] The distinction between the value of the lessee's possessory interest and his equity therein demonstrates why the
value of that interest is not the same as the damages the
lessee would receive if it were taken by eminent domain. In
eminent domain the full value of the interest must be paid
for, but since the taking discharges the obligation to pay
future rent, the value of that obligation to the lessor must be
awarded to him. (City of Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 387
[257 P. 526, 53 A.L.R. 679].) Although the lessee is awarded
damages equal only to the value of his equity, he receives the
full value of his possessory interest, for his obligation to pay
rent is discharged.
[8] It wonld be anomalous to hold that a possessory interest has no value merely because the lessee has agreed
to pay what it is worth. As we pointed out in the DeLuz
case, the value of a long-term possessory interest may.approach
the value of the fee (45 Ca1.2d at 570), and even in the case
of land that does not depreciate in value, the present value
of a reversion that cannot be enjoyed for many years may be
small compared to the present value of the use in the interim.
Thus, the value of the right to use the land in perpetuity may
be little greater than the value of the right to use it for the
Juration of a long-term lease, and in such a case a purchaser
of the fee of unleased land would payor agree to pay little
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more t.hall a I..s~'(>'· \lIII11r1 f"I' .1 l"llg "'1"111 1'·lLSI'. We would
trifle with rcality 10 hold thaL Ilcw(·thcless the lessee received
nothing of value whereas the purchaser received the full value
of the fee.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that unless rent is deducted ill
computing the net income for "aluation purposes, au unconstitutional tax 011 the city's tax-exempt interest will be imposed. (Const. art. XIII, § 1.) They point out that the land
is tax exempt regardless of how it is used and that therefore
the city's exemption is not lost because it uses its land by
leasing it to private parties. If its lessees, however, unlike
:lessees of privately-owned land, must pay taxes on their
: possessory interests ill addition to rent equal to the full rental
i value, the city will necessarily have to reduce its rents by
the amount of such taxes to compete with private lessors.
Accordingly, plaintiffs conclude that to value leaseholds without making a deduction for rent will result in imposing a tax
on the city's right to use its land by lea.c;ing it.
[9] When the city leases its land, however, it does not
merely use it. It creates valuable privately-held possessory
interests, and there is no reason why the owners of such interests should not pay taxes on them just as lessees of private
property do through increased rents. Their use is not public,
but private, and as such should carry its share of the tax
burden. [10] Moreover, the city does not lose its tax exemption by leasing its land. The reversion is not taxed, for it is
only the value of the use for the unexpired term of the lease
that is assessed. Thus, whereas lessees of private property
indirectly pay taxes through increased rent on the full value
of the land including the lessor's reversion, the city's lessees
pay taxes only on the value of the possessory interests granted
to them lly the city. The city retains the full benefit of its
tax exemption on the interest it has retained. [11] The city
is not afforded a competitive advantage over private owners
when it sells the fee, for the land is taxable to its new private
owner whatever its source. [12] Similarly, the city is not
entitled to a competitive advantage over private lessors when
it sells lesser interests carved out of the public domain. Of.
course the city would be able to charge higher rents if it
could extend the mantle of its tax exemption over the private
interests it creates in its lands, but since it is only its own
property that is tax exempt, it is not entitled to that advantage. Since the tax is on the private interest alone, it is immat.erial tlHlt 1111' dellial of tlmt "o'lIpl'titive advallt::.::!!' might

64

he an

TUAS
('conomi~

Co.

tI.

COUNTY OF Los

burden on the dty.

'\'". Crntnty ,,' Lo.' A n.gele$, 51

ANGELES

[52 C.2d

(General Dynamics Corp.
at pp. 59, 63 [330
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r.2d 794], and ('asl's cited.)
[13] Plaintiffs contend that sillce the DeLuz case over. ruled the Blinn case, it should be given prospective effect
only and should not be applied in valuing leaseholds created
before it was decided. 'I'hey rely on CO!L11ty of Los Angeles
v. FallS, 48 Ca1.2d 672, 681 [312 P.2d 680], decided after the
DeLuz case, in which the court stated that "where a constitutional provision or statute has received a given construction
by a court of last resort and contracts have been made or
property rights acquired under and in accordance with its
decision, such contracts will not be invalidated nor will vested
rights acquired under the decision be impaired by a change
of construction adopted in a subsequent decision. Under
those circumstances it has been the rule to give prospective,
and not retrospective, effect to the later deci~ion."
The rule of the Faus case is not applicable here, for recognition of the correct rule of valuation of possessory interests
for tax purposes neither invalidates the leases nor impairs
vested rights. Thus we did not apply the Faus rule in the
DeLuz case, although it had been recognized in earlier cases.
(See People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. 364, 369 [92 P. 853] ; People
v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 263 [86 P. 187].) Moreover, in
these cases the taxes did not become due before the DeLuz
case was decided, defendants are not seeking to collect additional taxes for years prior to that decision, and there is no
machinery by which they could do so. The assessor has applied the DeLuz rule in these cases only to taxes on existing
interests falling due after the date of that decision. In no
proper sense may such application be considered retro~ctive.
[14] Although those who acquire property or make contracts in reliance of the existing tax laws may be disappointed
in their economic expectations when those laws are changed,
they acquire no vested right that such changes shall not be
made. Taxes on existing interests are not immutable, for
within constitutional limits the Legislature has full freedom
to change them. Surely an erroneous interpretatiou of a tax
statute cannot be more immutable than the statute itself, and
if the court failed to give effect to the correction of- its own
error, it would defeat the legislative purpose not only as to
the past but for the indefinite future.
Cases cited by plaintiffs giving prospective effect to tax
decisions are fully in accord with our conclusion herein. AI-
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though in MOIlII' of t hrm till' C'ollrt. Rl'pl il'd t hI' III'W rule only
to taxes falling due after the date o[ th(' drcision (Button v.
Drake, 302 Ky. 517 (195 S.W.2d 66, 70, 167 A.L.R. 1046];
German Gymnastic Assn. v. City of lhuisville, 306 Ky. 810
[209 S.W.2d 75, 76] ; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge
No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131 (156 P.2d 340, 358] ; Boarel
of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian, etc. Assn., 195 Okla. 458
[158 P.2d 904, 906]; Mercantile Nat. Batik v. Lander, 109
F. 21, 25-26; Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Dept. of
Tax., 260 Wis. 551 (51 N.W.2d796, 799-800] ; Arizona State
Tax Com. v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376 [257 P.2d 392, 393];
Franklin Oounty Court v. Louisville & Nash. R. R. Co., 84
Ky. 59, 64-65), in others the court applied the new rule to
determine the tax liability then in litigation but pointed out
that it would not apply to taxpayers whose past liability had
been determined without litigation in reliance on the overruled decision. (Duhame v. State Tax Com., 65 Ariz. 268
[179 P.2d 252, 259-2EiO, 261-262,171 A.L.R. 684] ; Yarbrough
v. Oklahotna Tax. Com., 200 Okla. 402 (193 P.2d 1017, 1021] ;
see also Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204 [78 N.E.2d 535,
543].) In none of the cases does it appear that the new rule
,vas not to apply to taxes thereafter falling due on existing
property, and in several it appears expressly that it was.
(German Gymnastic Assn. v. Oity of Loltisville, 306 Ky. 810
[209 S.W.2d 75, 76] ; Oklahoma County v. Queen C-ity Lodge
No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131 [156 P.2d 340, 358] ; Board
of Equalizaticm v. Tftlsa Pythian, etc. Assn., 195 Okla. 458
[158 P.2d 904, 906].)
In 1957 the Legislature added section 107.1- to the Revenue
·Section 101.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides:
A pOllllesso~ interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt propert;r•
. eonsiats of the lessee's interest under sueh lease and is hereby declared
to be personal property within the meaning of Bection 14 of Article XIII
of the Constitution of the State of Califomia.
"The full eash value of such p08se890~ interest is the exceas, if any.
of the value of the lease on the open market, a. determined by the
formula contained in the eaBe of DeLus Homell, InC. v. C010Iflfy 0/
Diego (1955), 45 CaL2d 546 [290 P.2d 544], over the present worth of
the rentals under said lease for the unexpired term thereof.
"A possessory interest taxable under the provisions of this section
ilhall be assessed to the lessee on the same basis or percentage of valua·
tion employed as to other tangible property on the lame roll.
"This section applies only to possessorY interests created prior to the
date on which the decision of the California Supreme Court in DeLus
Home" If1c. v. C01l"ty Of S"n Diego (19;;5),45 Ca1.2d 546, became final.
It does not, however, apply to any of sueh interests ereated prior to that
date that thereafter have been, or may hereafter be, extended or renewed,
II
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anrl Taxation' ("--ode. It providf''' t.hat the "full cash value"
of p0f;.<les,o.:ory intercstR created bcrore the decision ill the DeLuz
case shall be determined by the formula adopted in that case
less "the present worth of the rentals under said lease for
the -unexpired term thereof." Although the taxes involved ill
these cases became due before the effective date of scction
107.1, plaintiffs contend that the section constitutes curath'e
legislation and should therefore be given restrospcctive effect.
Defendants contend that the section is unconstitutional and
that, in any event, it cannot be given retrospcctive effcct.
[15] The constitutionality of section 107.1 is directly involved in a case now pending in the District Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District. For the purposes of the present
case we may assume without deciding that the statute is constitutional. Since the taxes became due before the section
became effective, it cannot be given restrospeetive effect, for
to do so would authorize an unconstitutional gift of public
funds. (Const., art. IV, § 31; Estate of Skinkc1', 47 Cal.2d
290, 296 {303 P.2d 745] ; Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 60
[204 P. 826] ; Estate of Rossi, 169 Cal. 148, 149 [146 P. 430] ;
Estate of MarUn, 153 Cal. 225, 228 {94 P. 1053] ; Trippet v ..
State, 149 Cal. 521, 528 (86 P. 1084, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 1210];
Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 118-121 [54 P. 259, 58 P.
462, 45 L.R.A. 788] ; Doctors General Hospital v. County of
Santa CZar'a, 150 Cal.App.2d 53, 55-57 [309 P.2d 501].)
Allen v. Franchise Taz Boar'd, 39 Cal.2d 109 [245 P.2d 297],
and Gartner v. Roth, 26 Cal.2d 184 [157 P.2d 361], are not to
the contrary. The Allen case involved a change in the income tax law that became effective before the state's right
to the tax vested, and the Gartner case involved not a change
in tax liability but a change in the law governing the right
to redeem property deeded to the state for nonpayment of
taxes.
The judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Petets, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgments
for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the opinion
irrespective of whether the renewal or extension is prol'jdcd for in the
instrument ereating the interest.
,. This section does not apply to leasehold estates for the production of
ItIlS, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances from b!'neath the Bur·
fnee of the earth, and other rights relating to such substances whil'h
constitute inl'orporl'ul her'lditnments or profitll a prp.ndre."
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prepal'ctl 11.\' him for the District Court of Appeal ill Tc.rq.~
Co. v. C01lllt1l of Los Angeles and l!'OI'stcr Shipbuilding CII.
v. County of Lo.,AlIgeles, (Cal.App.) 333 P.2d 97.
Apt>ellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 20,
1959. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should
be granted.
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